Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements: Agriculture by Fautrel, Vincent & Alpha, Arlene
Under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement
(CPA), signed in 2000 by the European
Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries (ACP), current non-recipro-
cal trade preferences are to be replaced by
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
One of the main features of these EPAs,
which are intended to play their part in sus-
tainable development and poverty reduc-
tion, is that they place trade between the
ACP regions and the EU on a more reciprocal
footing. In view of its socio-economic impor-
tance for the ACP countries and the share of
trade between the ACP and the EU for
which it accounts, agriculture is a key sector
in the EPA negotiations. The scope of these
negotiations is also to be seen in the
broader context of the agricultural negotia-
tions at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the reform of the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (section 1). At pres-
ent, agricultural trade between the ACP
countries and the EU is already facing many
challenges, ranging from the erosion of ACP
trade preferences on the EU market to the
establishment of standards and to supply-
side constraints within the ACP countries.
These are described in section 2, stressing
the issues specific to the least-developed
countries (LDCs), areas of agreement and
disagreement between the LDC and non-
LDC ACP countries, and links between the
EPA and WTO negotiations as regards these
issues. In section 3, EPA issues are examined
from the point of view of the EU, specifying
a possible negotiating strategy based on the
free trade agreements (FTAs) which it has
previously signed. This analysis is then used
to pinpoint various negotiating options for
the ACP countries, including the develop-
ment dimension of EPAs (section 4); by way
of conclusion, the provisions that could be
adopted to construct an “ideal” EPA are then
discussed (section 5).
1 EPAs in the context of 
international agricultural
negotiations 
Problems surrounding agriculture
at the WTO and the main 
questions concerning the ACP
countries in the Doha Round 
Agriculture, as a result of the particular role
which it plays in food security, job creation,
export revenue and rural development, has
always been a sensitive area in trade liberal-
isation talks. Long excluded from global lib-
eralisation processes under the GATT,1 the
agricultural sector was finally included
when the Uruguay Round negotiations were
being concluded in 1994.
The various strands of the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) signed in 1994 are being
negotiated in the new negotiating round
launched at November 2001 at the 4th WTO
Ministerial Conference at Doha (Qatar). This
new round, known as the “Development
Round”, which put forward the principle of
special and differential treatment (S&DT)
for the developing countries, has not so far
managed to achieve the objectives set at
Doha (see Box 1 for a summary).
Within the WTO, the ACP group made it
clear at a very early stage that it needed an
appropriate margin of manoeuvre if coun-
tries were to implement agricultural policies
supportive of their development goals,
poverty reduction strategies, food security
and livelihood concerns. The group also
wanted to be able to gain improved market
access for its primary and processed agri-
cultural products.
Although some progress was made in July
2004 with a framework agreement on (lib-
eralisation) modalities and in December
2005 at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference
in Hong Kong (China),2 negotiations were
suspended in July 2006 as no compromise
could be reached. This means that many of
the concerns put forward by the ACP group
prior to the Hong Kong conference in
December 2005 are still very relevant, espe-
cially the need to:
InBrief 
No. 13C - April 2007
The aim of this InBrief series is to identify the key issues at stake within the various chapters of the Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) being negotiated between the European Union and six African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regional
groupings. Each InBrief addresses one chapter, offering an overview of the trade or trade-related provisions, highlighting their
relevance for the ACP and identifying a range of policy options for the negotiations.
Negotiating Economic 
Partnership Agreements
Agriculture
Arlène Alpha, GRET and Vincent Fautrel, CTA
European Centre for Development Policy Management
Centre européen de gestion des politiques de développement
Page 2 Negotiating economic partnership agreements April 2007  InBrief 13C
www.ecdpm.org/inbrief13c
• take practical steps in the area of prefer-
ence erosion (in accordance with para-
graph 44 of the framework agreement of
July 2004) by designating ACP export
products likely to suffer preference ero-
sion as “sensitive products”;• find favourable ways of identifying and
treating special products3 and apply spe-
cial safeguard mechanisms4 (for instance,
by making special products eligible for
the special safeguard mechanism) ;• review and clarify Blue and Green Box
domestic support criteria5 to ensure that
measures under these boxes have mini-
mal or no trade-distorting effects.
ACP agricultural products and their
European market access: Cotonou
Agreement, GSP and EBA initiative 
If we are to understand the agricultural
issues connected with the Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), we need
briefly to look at the European market access
conditions for ACP agricultural products.
ACP products enter under one of the follow-
ing three schemes:• trade provisions of the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement (CPA);• the generalised system of preferences
(GSP) applied to all developing countries;
• the “Everything-But-Arms” (EBA) initiative
reserved for the least-developed countries
(LDCs).
CPA
The CPA provisions on European market
access are based, for the transitional period
from 2000 to 2007, on the non-reciprocal
trade preferences granted to the ACP coun-
tries. The principle is in most cases (some
97% of products) one of non-reciprocal
duty- and quota-free access. There are nev-
ertheless three important provisions:• the application of detailed rules of origin
(RO);• the existence of the safeguard clause;• exceptions arising from the application of
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP); these exceptions, which concern
the access of ACP agricultural product
exports covered by the CAP, and poten-
tially competing agricultural products
covered by the CAP, are set out in the fol-
lowing documents:
- Annex V and Declaration XXII of the CPA,
- the various product-specific protocols
(sugar, bovine meat and bananas) under
which specific volumes of these prod-
ucts can be exported to the European
market at a reduced rate of duty and
which guarantee, in the case of the
sugar and bovine meat protocols, the
same price level as guaranteed to EU
producers.
GSP
Under the generalised system of prefer-
ences (GSP) applied by the EU, imports from
178 developing countries and territories can
enter the EU market at lower tariffs or duty-
free. The EU scheme grants special advan-
tages to the 49 LDCs (EBA initiative – see
below) and to countries which have imple-
mented specific standards on working con-
ditions or the environment. The EU’s GSP is
implemented in ten-year cycles and general
guidelines are drawn up. The previous cycle
ended in 2005 and a new GSP has been
adopted for the period 2006-2008 in line
with the Commission’s proposal. This pro-
posal is intended to improve the current sys-
tem in various fields: simplification
(reduction of the number of arrangements
from five to three), extension of the range
of products covered, concentration of advan-
tages on those developing countries most in
need and the introduction of a system of
additional advantages called “GSP+” to
encourage sustainable development.
EBA initiative 
Adopted by the Council of the EU in
February 2001, the EBA regulation allows
duty-free access by all imports from LDCs
with no restrictions on quantity, with the
exception of arms and munitions. A specific
timetable has also been drawn up for the
progressive liberalisation of imports of fresh
Table 2. EU nominal average protection against agricultural and agri-food products (from developing countries) by
groups of countries/arrangements in 2000
Source: Tables 4 and 7 in Gallezot, J., Real access to the EU’s agricultural market, 24 July 2003,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/july/tradoc_113490.pdf
*1  MFN: Most Favoured Nation
*2 Corresponds to the residual tariffs on imports from countries benefitting from a preferntial access.
Imports
Year 2000 (EUR '000)
MFN*1 (pref.
Preference group country)*2 % Pref. % MFN % Total %
ACP (other than LDC) 50595 0.1 5103610 9.9 5154205 10
Other preferences 2642860 5.1 7835250 15.2 10478109 20.3
MFN 11599325 22.5 11599325 22.5
LDC 74663 0.1 1236987 2.4 1311650 2.5
GSP 18510733 35.9 4567045 8.8 23077778 44.7
Total 21278850 41.2 18742892 36.3 11599325 22.5 51621066 100
Table 1. Breakdown of the EU’s agricultural and agri-food imports by tariff regime and preference group 
Average Average Imports from preferential countries
duty duty
Percentage Total
Pref. Group Preferential imports covered
MFN countries by
% % preferences 1000E
ACP (+LDCs) 20.7 5.3 98.6 6485610
Other preferences 20.7 2.7 74.6 10499303
GSP 20.7 17.9 19.8 23052814
Total 20.7 25.9 46.8 40037728
InBrief 13C April 2007 Negotiating economic partnership agreements Page 3
www.ecdpm.org/inbrief13c
bananas, rice and sugar. While bananas
were effectively liberalised in January 2006
(application of the tariff-only system), sugar
and rice imports will be fully liberalised only
in 2009. In the meantime, quota-based
duty-free access has been granted.
Although the EBA initiative is part of the
GSP, it states that the special arrangements
for LDCs will be maintained for an unlimited
period and that they will not be included in
the periodic renewal of the Community’s
generalised systems of preferences.
CAP reform: issues of importance
for the ACP countries 
The access conditions discussed above have
to be seen in the context of the interactions
between EU trade and agricultural policy.
The current reform of the CAP is having a
direct impact on the EU’s stance on trade
negotiations and is an important parameter
in the current EPA negotiations. The current
reform of the CAP is having two types of
impact on the ACP countries: on the one
hand, European market access conditions
and, on the other, effects on ACP markets.
The reform of the CAP, with the shift away
from the price support system (under which
high prices were guaranteed for staple agri-
cultural products) to the system of direct aid
for farmers, is reducing staple agricultural
product prices in the EU and therefore
reducing the advantages that ACP exporters
have up to now enjoyed as a result of the
preferential access of ACP agricultural prod-
ucts to the EU market. This process has
already started in the bovine meat, rice and
sugar sectors. Lower domestic prices enable
the EU, moreover, to reduce its border pro-
tection thereby eroding the preferential
margins of the ACP countries in comparison
with those of other developing countries.
While the current reform of the CAP is hav-
ing an impact on the access of ACP coun-
tries to the EU market, it could also have
repercussions on ACP markets as a result of
competition with imports of EU agricultural
products whose prices are falling. One of
the main goals of the reform is in practice
to make exports of agricultural products
from the EU more competitive. Opening up
ACP markets in an uncontrolled way to EU
agricultural imports could have serious con-
sequences for national and regional ACP
agricultural sectors (see section 3).
2 The importance of 
agricultural trade for the ACP
countries 
Importance of agriculture for 
the ACP countries
Agriculture is a key sector in the economy of
most of the ACP regions in terms both of
the share of GDP for which it accounts, and
employment and trade. Except in the
Caribbean region, over 65% of the labour
force are employed in agriculture (55% inSource: FAO. ACP-A: Africa ; ACP-C: Caribbean; ACP-P: Pacific
Table 5: Share of agriculture in trade
Table 4: Share of agriculture in employment
Table 3: Share of agriculture in GDP
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the other developing countries). Agricultural
exports continue to account for a very con-
siderable share of trade, if oil products are
excluded. One of the main features of these
exports, however, is that they are highly
concentrated on a very small number of sta-
ple products which also suffer from highly
volatile prices and low revenue elasticity.
Current major issues in ACP
agricultural trade 
While the agricultural sector is obviously
important, its ability to continue to con-
tribute sustainably to economic development
will depend in particular on the ability of the
ACP countries and regions to meet a number
of challenges connected with agricultural
trade. These challenges can be grouped under
two headings: ACP product access to external
markets and competition from imports in
national and regional ACP markets.
These challenges are discussed briefly below
solely from the point of view of ACP-EU
agricultural trade, as the EU is the main
trading partner in at least four of the six
ACP regions (African regions). Agricultural
exports from the ACP countries to the EU
are nevertheless declining in proportional
terms: from 63% in 1990 to 55% in 2003.
Similarly, agricultural products now account
for only 17% of total ACP exports to the EU
in comparison with 26% in 1995.6
Preference erosion 
For over thirty years, the ACP countries have
benefited from trade preferences in the EU
market under the Lomé Conventions and
the Cotonou Agreement. The value of these
preferences is currently being eroded for
three different reasons:• multilateral trade liberalisation within the
WTO,• bilateral trade liberalisation (as a result of
the free trade agreements (FTAs) which the
EU is concluding with other trading blocs,• CAP reform.
Although the impact of these factors differs
for different products and for different
countries, they are nevertheless a matter of
serious concern for the ACP group as a
whole.7
Tariff and non-tariff barriers
Over and above the problem of preference
erosion, the ACP countries are having to
cope with a whole series of constraints con-
nected, on the one hand, with residual tar-
iffs on some export products and, on the
other hand, with the rules of origin and the
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures
imposed by the European market.
Although the Cotonou Agreement allows
duty-free access for most ACP exports, this
principle is subject to restrictions for some
sensitive products for which there continue
to be tariff barriers (special duties). Although
this is an issue which in practice involves
only the non-LDC ACP countries (as the LDCs
benefit from the EBA initiative), it is never-
theless an important one for some countries
(for instance table grapes from Namibia).
The second type of constraint, connected
with rules of origin and the question of SPS
standards,8 applies to all the ACP countries.
The rules of origin and cumulation condi-
tions which shape the duty-free access of
ACP products to the European market have
long been and in some cases still are a major
barrier to ACP exporters. These rules are
particularly significant in the field of added
value food products for which packaging
products account for a significant proportion
of the cost of the finished product.
SPS standards are becoming an increasingly
important issue, especially as European reg-
ulations are becoming tougher and tariff
barriers are being substantially reduced.
Technical standards (for instance the quality
of packaging) are also tending to place real
barriers in the way of exports from the ACP
countries. The standards applied in Europe
are felt to be very strict, and much tougher
overall than international standards. The
entry into force in January 2006 of the
Community Regulation on official controls
performed to ensure the verification of
compliance with feed and food law, animal
health and animal welfare (882/2004) is, for
instance, placing two major barriers in the
way of the ACP countries:
(i) exporting enterprises’ compliance 
with the EU’s technical health safety
standards for foodstuffs;
(ii) institutional capacity in terms of certi-
fication and verification of compliance.
A study commissioned by the CTA (2003)9
showed that 17 ACP countries produced
some 83% of ACP product exports in regions
likely to be the most affected by SPS
measures, the worst hit being horticultural
and fisheries products.
In addition to European public standards,
private standards imposed by economic
operators under codes of conduct are prolif-
erating. The CTA study (2003) showed in
particular that importers and large retail
chains in the EU were including the EU’s leg-
islative requirements in sectoral codes of
practice (Eurepgap, for instance) which very
often went beyond health and safety con-
cerns to include social and environmental
requirements under the pretext of compli-
ance with SPS standards. The cost involved
in complying with these standards may be
too high especially when export volumes
are relatively small.
Import competition 
The challenges connected with the
European market access of ACP products are
being exacerbated by further challenges
from competition from imported products
in the markets of ACP countries; this compe-
tition is often branded unfair because of the
domestic and export subsidies practices
used by the developed countries and the EU
in particular. This issue is closely linked to
the reform of the EU’s CAP (see section 1)
which is of crucial importance in particular
for the African ACP countries which are
closely linked to the EU market in terms of
both imports and exports.
While this trade may be a source of low-cost
imports and help to improve food security
especially in the net-food-importing devel-
oping countries (NFIDCs), its effect may also
be to weaken the industrial development
base provided by agriculture in the ACP
countries; in turn, this has repercussions on
employment and livelihoods in rural
regions.
Problems connected with production
capacity
To conclude, trade potential in the ACP
countries, especially the African LDC mem-
bers of the ACP group, is being undermined
by low production capacity despite potential
improvements in terms of market access
and import competition.
Supply-side problems in general range from
the lack of public infrastructure (obsolete
road and rail networks), high transaction
costs, the lack of reliable public services
(electricity and water supplies, for instance),
costs arising from the lack or shortcomings
of institutional and political frameworks
(leading to corruption, exchange rate fluctu-
ations and high inflation) and low labour
The LDCs of the ACP Group 
The following points need to be taken into
account when examining the least-develo-
ped countries of the group of ACP countries:
• most non-LDCs are in one ACP
region (the Caribbean);
• over half of all members of the ACP
group are LDCs;
• over 60% of the population of the
ACP countries live in LDCs*.
* This figure does not include the popula-
tion of South Africa which is an ACP coun-
try but is not considered to be a full
member of the ACP Group for the purpose
of trade negotiations.
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productivity (which can be explained by the
lack of education and health facilities and
accommodation).
In the agri-food sector in particular, adverse
meteorological conditions combined with
the lack of irrigation systems, the instability
of the land system, low technological levels
and weak institutions are having a direct
impact on the production capacity of the
ACP countries. Their processing and market-
ing capacity is also very limited because
post-harvest and processing equipment and
technologies are lacking, and market infor-
mation systems are inadequate and lack
reliability. While the lack of financial
resources and capital is also a major aspect,
their capacity to manufacture high-quality
products is undoubtedly one of the main
challenges facing ACP exporters of agricul-
tural products. The institutional capacity of
ACP governments to efficiently verify com-
pliance with the EU’s health safety stan-
dards for foodstuffs in order to provide
certification (see the preceding section on
SPS measures) seems to be a particularly
significant point in this respect.
Problems linked with production capacity
are therefore a very significant issue for the
ACP countries and should be a major focus
of EPA negotiations.
Particular features of the LDCs
Although the main agricultural trade issues
discussed above apply to the ACP countries
as a whole, there are some fundamental dif-
ferences between the least-developed ACP
countries and the others. While, in the case
of market access, for instance, residual tariff
barriers are not an issue for the least-devel-
oped ACP countries, they are likely to find 
it more difficult to resolve the problems
connected with SPS measures and with
production capacity.
In the case of trade negotiations, the dis-
tinction between LDCs and non-LDCs is
leading to different treatment both in the
WTO and from the point of view of EPAs.
Under the WTO rules, the least-developed
ACP countries may claim non-reciprocal
trade preferences. This right cannot be dis-
puted at the WTO, in contrast to the right
granted under the trade provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement. In practice, the EU has
recognised this right through the
“Everything-But-Arms” initiative (see the
section above). However, in the EPA negotia-
tions, the ACP LDCs, as members of a cus-
toms union, should be subject to the same
reciprocal tariff reduction obligations as the
other ACP countries of the region.
In this context, the ACP LDCs would be quite
right to ask what additional advantages
they would gain from signing an EPA when
all their domestic products already benefit
from duty- and quota-free access to the EU
market under the EBA initiative. From the
point of view of market access, deciding to
sign an EPA therefore has more to do, in the
case of the LDCs, with the issue of the non-
tariff advantages from which they could
benefit under an EPA. This could concern,
for instance, more favourable rules of origin
and cumulation, cooperation and support
measures in order to meet SPS standards,
and the inclusion of a development strand
enabling them genuinely to profit from
duty-free access.
In the context of the EPAs, the distinction
between LDC and non-LCD ACP countries is
clearly a factor likely to place regional inte-
gration processes on a less secure footing.
Links between EPA and WTO 
negotiations to address the 
challenges of agricultural trade10
As mentioned in the introduction, the ACP
countries are involved in two parallel trade
negotiations (see Box 2 for a summary).
In general, the WTO and EPA negotiations
differ in a number of respects:• The WTO negotiations are taking place in
a multilateral forum, while the EPAs are
being negotiated in the context of bilat-
eral negotiations between the ACP coun-
tries and the EU.• Each WTO member country may put for-
ward its own negotiating position,
although, in the case of the ACP countries,
positions generally tend to be put for-
ward by groups of countries. The EPAs are
being negotiated between ACP regional
integration zones and the EU.• Negotiation timetables do not have the
same deadlines, although there is some
overlap. Although the Doha Round talks
were suspended from July 2006 to
February 2007, and there is considerable
doubt as to whether the Round can be
completed by the end of 2007, the CPA
has set a cut-off date for EPA negotiations
at 31 December 2007.
These parallel negotiations are nevertheless
linked and may have an effect on one
another:• They cover similar issues as regards
agricultural trade by the ACP countries.• It is important for the ACP countries to
have an overall vision of these negotia-
tions so that they can pinpoint any linked
negotiating points. Progress in the WTO
negotiations and in the definition of
multilateral rules necessarily has an
impact on the EPA negotiations, as what-
ever emerges from these latter negotia-
tions has to comply with WTO rules. In
contrast, progress in EPA negotiations
may make it possible to construct WTO
negotiating positions. These positions
could be put forward by the whole of 
the ACP Group when the countries have
common interests which go beyond the
framework of regional integration.• Recent developments in the two nego-
tiating forums seem to show, moreover,
that the negotiating timetables are being
reversed. Difficulties in progressing the
agricultural negotiations at the WTO and
the repeated failure to find a compromise
mean in practice that the negotiation
timetable is slipping forward in time: there
are still doubts about the completion of
the Round by the end of 2007. The EPA
negotiation deadline nevertheless seems
much less flexible as it is linked to the sec-
ond derogation which the EU obtained
from the WTO for its non-reciprocal trade
preference regime with the ACP countries.
It is more difficult to envisage this provi-
sional derogation, granted on the proviso
that it was the last and intended to bring
the EU-ACP trade regime into compliance
with WTO rules, being continued beyond 1
January 2008.11 Several ACP regions have
nevertheless indicated that the EPA negoti-
ations could (or should) be extended
beyond 2007, if necessary.
Some specific points of the WTO negotia-
tions are having a direct impact on the EPA
negotiations:
Article XXIV of the GATT
This Article, which derogates from the GATT
principle of the most favoured nation, states
that a country or group of countries may
grant preferential trade treatment to an-
other country or group of countries, if the
relations between these countries are gov-
erned by a free-trade area or a customs
union, i.e. if trade preferences are reciprocal.
The article defines a free-trade area or a
customs union in a very imprecise way and
merely states that they must cover substan-
tially all of trade. The EU has undertaken to
reform its trade regime with the ACP coun-
tries in order to comply with this article. In
its previous free-trade agreements con-
cluded with other developing countries, the
EU has interpreted this as meaning that
90% of trade should be covered and that
asymmetrical reciprocity is possible.
At the 5th Ministerial Conference in Cancún,
the ACP Group called for a revision of Article
XXIV to take account of the differences in
levels of development between the two
parties and to specify “substantially all of
trade”, transition periods and the principle
of reciprocity. The idea is that, in the case of
an EPA with the EU, the ACP countries can
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limit the introduction of reciprocity and
therefore the risk of increased competition
from EU imports in their markets.
With a view to specifying Article XXIV, it
would seem sensible for the ACP countries
first to make progress in the EPA negotia-
tions and to find a compromise with the EU
on what is covered by “substantially all of
trade” and how far to go with asymmetrical
relations. The ACP countries could then put
forward a detailed position, possibly with
the EU, in the multilateral forum. At the
same time, keeping the article relatively
hazy can be seen as a way of ensuing mar-
gins of manoeuvre, but may also run of risk
of numerous disputes about the interpreta-
tion of the article.
This kind of revision of Article XXIV would
not enable the LDCs to avoid reciprocity in
the framework of the EPAs, but simply to
limit it. It is hard to see how, in a regional
integration zone which has signed an EPA,
countries could claim their LDC status at the
WTO in order to avoid reciprocity when their
non-LDC neighbours were introducing
reciprocity, while ensuring the liberalisation
of substantially all of trade. The only way in
which the LDCs could avoid reciprocity
would be not to sign an EPA.
Special products 
In the Framework Agreement of July 2004
and the Hong Kong Declaration, the WTO
authorises the LDCs, under the rules on
special and differential treatment (S&DT), to
designate an appropriate number of special
products for reasons of food security, rural
development and poverty reduction (see
Box 1). These products would then benefit
from special treatment as regards the
application of the tariff reduction formula.
Practical methods for the treatment of spe-
cial products nevertheless remain to be
defined. Proposals have been put forward,
some by the ACP countries (in the context of
G33).12Designating special products could
therefore provide a basis for pinpointing
products which could be excluded from
EPAs. The problem remains, however, that
each ACP country can put forward its own
list of special products to the WTO, but the
list of products to be excluded from the EPA
has to be drawn up at regional level: this
means that countries which may have dif-
ferent interests as regards EU imports may
have to find a consensus.13
Special safeguard mechanism 
In the same way as for special products, the
Agreement of July 2004 and the Hong Kong
Declaration make provision for a special
safeguard mechanism (SSM) which may be
used by developing countries in the case of
imports on a massive scale or sudden falls in
import prices. The methods by which this
mechanism is to operate are also being
negotiated: trigger mechanism (automatic
or special procedure), duration, eligible prod-
ucts and, in particular, links with special
products, and content (additional duties
and/or quantitative reductions), etc. Here
again, the WTO negotiations may have an
impact on the EPA negotiations and pave the
way for a special safeguard mechanism for
EU imports. This provisional mechanism
could apply to those products which have
not been excluded from the EPA, but could
also apply to other products if the continued
duties on those products do not appear
enough to protect against the damaging
effects of competition from European
imports. Negotiating a mechanism of this
kind in an EPA would obviously be much eas-
ier if the WTO negotiations were sufficiently
advanced. It could nevertheless draw on the
WTO proposals and negotiations even if the
Doha Round has not been completed.
Where the ACP countries agree
As mentioned above, LDC status means that
these countries are not treated in the same
way as the other developing countries, both
in the WTO negotiations (tariff reduction
exemption) and in bilateral dealings with
the EU (EBA initiative for market access).
This special treatment may mean that LDC
and non-LDC ACP countries have differing
interests as regards some of the points
being negotiated, but may largely agree on
other points even if there are differences as
to the details:
Trade preference erosion: towards a
loss compensation mechanism 
The generalised reduction of the duties
applied within the WTO, and therefore the
reduction of preferential margins for the
ACP countries, is affecting both LDCs and
non-LDCs. The reform of the CAP, reflected in
particular by falling agricultural product
prices, is also affecting all the ACP countries.
As there is less of a differential between
European internal prices and world prices,
the duties charged by the EU are being
reduced and this is again eroding the prefer-
ences of all the ACP countries. Moreover, the
reduction of the internal prices from which
exports from the ACP countries benefited,
under the product protocols, is affecting all
the ACP countries whether or not they are
LDCs. In the case of sugar in particular,
although the protocol is to be retained in
the reform of the Common Market
Organisation (purchase of duty-free quotas),
the European internal price will be
decreased by 36% over four years. The LDCs
are also affected as they will receive the
same price as the non-LDC ACP countries,
i.e. the new European internal price. The ACP
countries as a whole are therefore likely to
suffer export revenue losses which may well
be over EUR 300 million.14 Countries like
Mauritius which are highly dependent on
the sugar protocol will be particularly badly
hit. In this context, both LDCs and non-LDCs
are calling for partial compensation of these
revenue losses and for adjustment meas-
ures.
Issues connected with SPS standards:
towards greater technical assistance 
As mentioned above, the development of
sanitary and phytosanitary, and technical,
standards at a time when tariff barriers are
substantially declining, is tending to
become the real barrier to exports from the
ACP countries. Exports from ACP countries,
especially those from the LDCs which are
less able to comply with these standards,
In short …
Although the WTO and EPA negotiations
differ in several respects, they are in practice
closely linked. The two negotiations are
increasingly taking place in parallel because
of the time lag in the WTO negotiating
timetable. Managing this growing
interaction between the two negotiations 
is no easy task for the ACP countries. They
have to ensure that the outcome of EPA
negotiations complies with WTO rules.
They need, moreover, to obtain a maximum
margin of manoeuvre in the WTO
negotiations to provide a favourable
multilateral framework for the EPA
negotiations which have to conform to this
framework. WTO negotiations have made
little real progress with the re-negotiation
of Article XXIV of the GATT which sets the
framework for free-trade areas, and will
probably not reach any conclusion in the
near future. It is therefore important for the
ACP countries to make progress with the
EPA negotiations by finding a compromise
with the EU so that they can then take a
detailed negotiating position to the
multilateral forum.
WTO negotiations on special products and
the special safeguard mechanism are more
advanced. The ACP countries may draw on
proposals made at the WTO. They will also
have to ensure, however, that the outcome
of the EPA negotiations complies with the
principles decided at multilateral level.
The recent suspension of the WTO negotia-
tions has nevertheless changed the situa-
tion. Many of the ACP regions are
negotiating, with the EU, the inclusion of a
revision clause, linked to the outcome of
the WTO negotiations, in the text of the
EPA, if this outcome turns out to be more
positive than the provisions adopted at EPA
level.
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are undoubtedly being limited by these
standards. Any lowering of the level of
European standards seems problematic
because they mirror growing consumer
requirements. It may nevertheless be possi-
ble for the LDC and non-LDC ACP countries
to call with one voice for the inclusion in the
EPA negotiations of the technical assistance
that they need to be able not just to respect
these standards but also to certify compli-
ance with them, which requires suitable cer-
tification bodies, laboratories, and human
and technical resources.
Structural supply-side constraints:
towards greater resources 
Over and above European market access
conditions, which may differ depending on
whether or not ACP countries have LDC sta-
tus, structural constraints connected with
supply capacity are preventing all the ACP
countries from being able fully to profit
from the export opportunities available to
them. For instance, low production and mar-
keting capacity in the LDCs is one of the
main curbs on the EBA initiative. If they are
to build their capacity, the ACP countries
need to be able to benefit from more sub-
stantial development aid, whether or not
they sign an EPA. The development strand of
the EPAs, which is now one of the key points
for negotiation, should be accompanied by
sufficiently ambitious financing to help the
ACP countries to tackle the structural prob-
lems which weigh heavily on their produc-
tion capacity. The LDC and non-LDC ACP
countries should here again be able to find
common ground. The immediate issue is not
so much one of obtaining more financing,
but of ensuring that existing financing is
channelled more into agricultural develop-
ment as a concentration sector.
Special products and special 
safeguard mechanisms: towards
ambitious mechanisms 
As mentioned above, while the LDCs are
exempt from tariff reductions in the WTO
negotiations, they may nevertheless desig-
nate an appropriate number of special prod-
ucts and benefit from a special safeguard
mechanism in the same way as the other
developing countries under the S&DT
framework. In practice, being able to main-
tain tariff levels is not always enough to
provide protection against import competi-
tion in local markets and with local produc-
tion. The possibility of applying additional
tariffs to, or of reducing quantities of,
imports is a particular concern for the LDCs
and the other developing countries. In the
EPA negotiations, the LDCs need to draw up,
together with the non-LDC ACP countries of
their regional integration zone, a list of
products which they would like to see
excluded from the EPAs, and could negotiate
a special safeguard mechanism specifically
for EU imports. This should enable the LDC
and non-LDC ACP countries to reach a con-
sensus through which special/sensitive
products can be designated and safeguard
mechanisms can be defined in a consistent
way in the WTO and EPA negotiations.
Where the ACP countries differ
In contrast to the above, the interests of the
LDC and non-LDC ACP countries seem to dif-
fer as regards at least two key agricultural
trade issues:
Residual tariff barriers 
For the LDC and non-LDC countries, the abo-
lition of residual tariff barriers is one of the 
major opportunities which an EPA with the
European Union may offer. Even though
European market access is very open in
practice to imports from the ACP countries,
there are still duties on some products
which are very important for the ACP coun-
tries, which the EU has retained because
imports could compete with domestic pro-
duction in the EU. The Cotonou Agreement
(Declaration XXII relating to Annex V) states
that the ACP countries may ask for new
agricultural products to be included under
the principle of duty and quota exemption.
Such an application nevertheless has to be
reasoned and inclusion is far from easy to
obtain.15
The Cotonou Agreement also reaffirmed the
Lomé product protocols for sugar, bovine
meat and bananas.16 For the non-LDC ACP
countries, these protocols represent quanti-
tative restrictions accompanied in some
cases by residual duties. They allow a certain
quantity of exports from the ACP countries
at a reduced or zero rate of duty, and in the
case of sugar and beef, allow the ACP coun-
tries to benefit from the European internal
price (higher than the world price and sta-
ble).
The abolition of residual tariff barriers is
therefore a major issue for the non-LDC ACP
countries when negotiating EPAs. The same
may not be true, however, of the LDC ACP
countries since the EBA initiative from which
they benefit has allowed them quota- and
duty-free access to the European market
since 2001 (2006 in the case of bananas and
2009 in the case of sugar and rice).
The product protocols (bananas and
sugar)
The differing interests of the ACP countries
as regards the product protocols are not just
shaped by their LDC or non-LDC status, but
also by their level of competitiveness and
dependence on the protocols. These differ-
ing interests may be especially marked if
the status of the product protocols in the
EPA is up for negotiation and is thus still
uncertain. The issues are particularly pro-
nounced for the sugar protocol, which con-
cerns the largest number of beneficiary ACP
countries and which is affected by the
reform of the Common Market Organisation
for sugar (CMO Sugar) where it is planned
to reduce the European internal price from
which the ACP countries benefit by 36%.
Product protocols
Sugar Bovine meat Bananas
Duty-free within quota Specific duties of 8% Duty-free within 
limits within quota limits quota limits 
European internal price European internal price 
In short …
The LDC and non-LDC ACP countries have
similar interests as regards a number of
issues, at both bilateral and multilateral
level. If they are to take concerted action to
put these interests across, the ACP countries
will first need to make their development
strategies consistent.
First, it is in the interests of all the countries
to call for effective compensation for losses
resulting from the erosion of preferences
that they are suffering as regards European
market access. This erosion is the result of
the WTO reduction of the tariffs that the EU
applies to imports from all its trading
partners, the development of bilateral
agreements between the EU and other
developing countries and the reform of the
CAP. Second, it is in the interests of all the
ACP countries to call for ambitious technical
assistance so that they can meet the EU’s
requirements as regards compliance with
SPS standards. Third, it is in the interests of
all the ACP countries to benefit from
ambitious and readily accessible funding
from the EU allowing them to tackle the
structural constraints which they face from
the point of view of their agricultural supply
capacities, Lastly, it is in all their interests to
negotiate defensive trade instruments –
special products and special safeguard
mechanisms – enabling them efficiently to
protect themselves against competition
between national output and imports from
the EU.
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There are two main options as regards the
status of the sugar protocol in the EPA:
either the protocol is separate from the EPA,
and therefore excluded from the products
covered by the EPA, for all the eligible ACP
countries, since it has been attached to the
Lomé and Cotonou Agreements (option A);
or the protocol is incorporated in the EPAs
(option B). The European Commission has
made it clear that it prefers option B.17
Under option A, sugar quotas would con-
tinue to be allocated to each country
whether or not they sign an EPA. If they do
not sign, the ACP LDCs would have free
access to the European market in 2009
under the “Everything-But-Arms” initiative
and would receive the guaranteed European
price. This price is guaranteed, however, only
up to the complete reform of the CMO
Sugar in 2009/2010. A reference price will
then be used to set the guaranteed price
under the preferential import regime. The
non-LDC ACP countries would continue to
benefit from the protocol and their situa-
tion would remain unchanged, unless the
protocol were to be amended as a result of
the reform of the COM Sugar, as for the
LDCs. Failure to sign an EPA would not
change anything as sugar is not covered by
the GSP. The risk of a complaint to the WTO
against the protocol should not, however, be
ruled out: the sugar protocol does not come
under the GSP but under the Cotonou trade
regime, with the same WTO derogations;
the derogation for the Cotonou unilateral
trade regime applies in practice to the pro-
tocol and will end at the end of 2007. It may
be that quotas remain unchanged or that
the European Commission decides to
increase them in order, for instance, to com-
pensate for the reduction of the European
internal price18. The winners under this
option would be the more competitive
countries (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland,
Zambia, Tanzania) which would take market
shares from countries not using their quo-
tas (assuming that quota allocation is not
global but specific to each country and is
based on net export surpluses).
Under option B, access conditions and price
guarantees remain open for negotiation by
the LDC and non-LDC ACP countries. For the
LDCs in particular, negotiations need to
cover the possibilities of free access to the
European market from 2008 if they sign an
EPA, as well as price guarantees, in order to
determine whether the EPA provides addi-
tional benefits over and above the EBA ini-
tiative. For the non-LDCs everything also
remains to be negotiated: both access levels
in terms of quantity, whether free as under
the EBA or with quotas (augmented or not)
or with safeguards, and price guarantees.
However, as the EPAs take a regional
approach, the quotas are likely to be allo-
cated to each ACP region signing an EPA,
then distributed between the countries of
the region, in all likelihood giving priority to
traditional exporters. In the Caribbean
region for instance, Guyana, Belize or
Jamaica could be among the winners to the
detriment of the “sugar islands” whose cur-
rent problems, bearing in mind their high
production costs, are likely to be exacer-
bated by the reform of the CMO Sugar.
Thought is also needed about those coun-
tries which are not LDCs and not signatories
to the protocol, but potential exporters of
sugar to the EU under the EPAs.
Bananas are another example. Under the
banana protocol, the ACP countries enjoy
duty-free access to the European market
within the limits of their tariff quotas. Non-
ACP exports, largely from Ecuador, Costa
Rica and Colombia (“dollar bananas”) were
taxed at EUR 75/tonne up to their quota
limit and very heavily thereafter (EUR
850/tonne). From 1 January 2006, a tariff-
only system at EUR 176/tonne has replaced
the system of tariff quotas by zones of ori-
gin, with the exception of the ACP countries
for which a tariff quota has been retained.
At present, the main ACP beneficiaries of
banana quotas are Cameroon and Côte
d’Ivoire in Africa and the Windward Islands
(St Lucia, St Vincent, Dominica) and Jamaica
in the Caribbean. The competitiveness of
these two producer regions is nevertheless
very different. Caribbean bananas are now
not just competing with dollar bananas but
also with African bananas. The current level
of duty does not in practice seem sufficient
to protect Caribbean bananas against com-
petition from dollar bananas, whereas it
appears to enable African bananas to main-
tain market shares.
In addition to the difference in status
between LDCs and non-LDCs, which is a key
factor, other factors may cause the interests
of ACP countries to differ. For instance, the
very different place which agriculture occu-
pies in the Caribbean region (largely domi-
nated by services) and in the African regions
may mean that differences arise when the
agricultural elements of EPAs are being
negotiated. Each region is attaching impor-
tance to this sector in the negotiations and
is defending offensive or defensive interests
in these negotiations depending on the
extent of this sector’s socio-economic role. It
is also clear that net-food-importing coun-
tries do not have the same interests as
those in which local production is high. This
makes it very difficult to achieve a regional
consensus and even more so a consensus
among all the ACP countries.
3 Agricultural trade: main
issues for the EU 
Following this analysis of agricultural trade
issues for the ACP regions and an examina-
tion of those issues about which the ACP
countries tend to agree and differ, we shall
now look at issues for the European Union
and examine the agricultural component of
the free-trade agreements which the EU has
signed with other regional trading blocs
and, lastly, describe the EU’s negotiating
stance on the agricultural questions raised
by EPAs.
In short …
While the interests of the various ACP
countries often converge, this is not true of
all the issues involved in the agricultural
trade negotiations currently under way.
A major difference between the ACP
countries which have LDC status and those
which do not lies in the area of improving
access to the European market. While the
non-LDC ACP countries are able to benefit
from improved access to the European
market as a result in particular of the
abolition of the tariff peaks and residual
tariffs which the EU has up to now retained,
this is not the case for the LDC ACP
countries. The latter already benefit from
duty-free, and will soon benefit from quota-
free, access for all their exports to the EU
under the “Everything-But-Arms” initiative.
Full liberalisation of European market
access is not therefore a particular concern
for them. If, in the context of the EPAs, the
EU were fully to liberalise access to its
market for all the ACP countries, the
preferential EU market access which the
LDC ACP countries currently enjoy would be
eroded, in contrast to the non-LDC ACP
countries.
Another major difference between ACP
countries concerns the reform of the
product protocols which is currently under
way: in particular sugar and bananas. Here,
differences between the ACP countries have
more to do with their level of
competitiveness and dependence on these
protocols. Those ACP countries which are
not very competitive or highly dependent
on the protocols are keen to safeguard as
many of the advantages that they currently
enjoy as they can. The more competitive ACP
countries or those less dependent on the
protocols do not take the same stance, as
they could well be able to gain market
shares from less competitive ACP countries.
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The main agricultural trade issues
for the EU
The EU’s agricultural trade policy is closely
linked to the CAP and the reform process
which has been under way since the 1990s
and is intended to:• lower intervention prices, i.e. the thresh-
old price from which the Union intervenes
to support European internal prices or
guaranteed prices. This tends to close the
gap between domestic prices and world
prices;• compensate for intervention price reduc-
tions by direct aid which is unconnected
with price levels or quantities produced
(decoupled aid);• reduce duties on imported products as
there is less need to protect the European
internal market to support prices
(because guaranteed prices are lower);• reduce export subsidies which have also
become less necessary because European
products are more competitive as guaran-
teed prices are lower.
The most recent reform of the CAP has intro-
duced major changes for a number of lead-
ing products, such as sugar. Reforms of the
CAP have always allowed the EU to antici-
pate WTO negotiations and to take offensive
positions. The European Union considers
that it has made the adjustments needed to
bring its agricultural policy in line with WTO
rules, and is trying to get the other WTO
members (chiefly the United States) to
undertake similar reforms. CAP reforms have
also enabled the EU to announce a substan-
tial reduction of its Amber box support – the
EU was one of the WTO members making
most use of this kind of support. As a result
of the 2003 reform, the EU announced at the
last WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong that it would end export refunds by
2013 provided that disciplinary methods
were drawn up for the other elements of the
export pillar of the Agreement on
Agriculture (see Box 1). The CAP reform
process therefore appears to be a prime
mover of the EU’s position in agricultural
negotiations at the WTO; any concession by
the EU being linked to the degree to which
the reform has advanced.
The agricultural component of the
free trade agreements signed by
the EU
An analysis of the previous free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) signed by the European Union
and its partners19 shows that the EU’s trade
in agricultural products is far from being
completely liberalised. The EU limits access
to its market by maintaining a number of
tariff barriers in order to avoid the poten-
tially adverse effects of trade liberalisation
and to take account of national interests
which require market protection.
The EU has used six instruments to regulate
agricultural trade in the FTAs signed with
the Mediterranean countries (Euro-Med),
South Africa, Mexico and Chile:• Tariff reductions, which may be complete
or partial for products subject to ad val-
orem or specific duties. In the case of the
EU, tariff reduction is often linked to
most-favoured-nation (MFN) duties while,
for its trading partners, the reduction is
applied to the tariffs actually in force, and
not to the WTO bound tariffs (higher).
Some FTAs do not specify any tariff reduc-
tion, but a final duty to be applied to
imports from the EU.• Tariff rate quotas for products exempted
from total tariff reductions. These are set
in terms of seasonal limits and the neces-
sary quantity adjustments. These adjust-
ments are carried out by applying a fixed
annual rate or decided each year when
the agreement is being reviewed.• Safeguard clauses, either common to all
products or special clauses. These clauses
help to protect against any increase in
import volumes or against a fall in the
price of imported products.• Rules of origin for agricultural products.• Flexible adjustments for access to trading
partners’ markets, made possible through
two types of clause:
- revision clauses under which the parties
undertake to examine the possibility of
enhancing the liberalisation of agricul-
tural products, taking account of agricul-
tural trade sensitivities and domestic
agricultural policies;
- flexibility clauses under which the part-
ners can amend the agreement if one of
the parties changes its domestic agricul-
tural policies.• Other specific duties may also exist but
are not common to all FTAs.
The FTAs signed by the European Union also
take two different approaches to agricul-
tural trade liberalisation:
• A list of products benefiting from prefer-
ential access is drawn up (for instance
Euro-Med). This approach of the positive
list type restricts the general scope of the
FTA and limits it to certain products. It
sets out the initial stages of the liberalisa-
tion process, but does not contain any
guidelines for the process overall. A revi-
sion clause provides flexibility for the
adoption of new and increased trade lib-
eralisation measures.• Timetables for overall liberalisation are
drawn up (for instance South Africa,
Mexico, Chile and Lebanon for imports to
the EU). Here again, some products are
excluded from the liberalisation process
and subject to preferential access, largely
within tariff quota limits. Adopting differ-
ent timetables or exemptions for differ-
ent groups of agricultural products, and
restricting market access through tariff
restrictions provides greater control over
the liberalisation process. Revision clauses
offer additional flexibility for products
exempted (at present) from trade liberali-
sation.
As a result, even though the main aim of
these agreements is to liberalise trade, it
would seem that various market protection
tools, especially tariff rate quotas, are con-
tinuing to exclude some products from this
process. It would seem, moreover, from all
the FTAs to which the EU is a signatory, that
the choice of the products subject to tariff
quota arrangements or total tariff reduction
reflects the level of protection granted to
these products and the existence of sur-
pluses for these respective products. In prac-
tice:• High levels of protection may mean that
there is little willingness to reduce tariffs
as that might undermine high domestic
prices.• High levels of protection of some prod-
ucts, for which there are also production
surpluses, are leading to tougher import
restrictions, for instance by not extending
tariff quotas.• The surpluses produced by the EU as a
result of protection which then need to
be disposed of, are encouraging the EU to
improve its access to the markets of its
trading partners.
A possible strategy of the EU
Commission 
The preceding discussion of the FTAs signed
by the EU, and the negotiating mandate
which the European Commission has been
given for the EPAs, may provide some point-
ers as to the form that the EU strategy could
take in the EPA negotiations:20• The EU might well offer duty-free access
like (or similar to) the access available to
In short …
The successive reforms of the CAP, in
particular the June 2003 reform, are not
unconnected with the EU’s negotiating
stance at the WTO. The EU undertook the
previous reform of the CAP prior to the 
re-negotiation of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture. The EU wanted to be in a strong
position in the WTO negotiations in order 
to obtain concessions from its trading
partners. It is therefore the CAP which is the
prime mover of the EU’s stance at the WTO
and not the reverse.
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the LDCs under the EBA initiative for
products which are not highly competi-
tive with its local output. In return, it asks
for substantial enough access to the mar-
kets of the ACP countries to comply with
GATT rules (Article XXIV).• For a number of particularly sensitive
products (those currently benefiting from
the most substantial protection and aid),
the EU is likely to provide itself with mar-
gins of flexibility. There could be major
tariff reductions for these sensitive prod-
ucts, but within quota limits for instance.
In other words, the EU is more likely to
use the liberalisation timetable approach,
with different timetables for different
products, than the positive list approach.• As the regional approach is a priority, ACP
countries in the same region are likely to
benefit from the same opening up of the
European market. Doubts about some
sensitive products such as sugar should
again be stressed here, and could lead to
different treatment for the LDC and non-
LDC ACP countries.• The EU is likely to put forward instru-
ments enabling it to control the liberalisa-
tion process as far as possible, such as
safeguard clauses, revision clauses and
flexibility clauses.• The EU should take care to differentiate
between CAP reform and EPA negotia-
tions which are two different processes.
Many of the CAP reforms have to do with
changes to the multilateral framework
and the Community interests that the EU
wants to uphold at the WTO, and have lit-
tle to do with the interests of the ACP
countries. For the EU, the issue of com-
pensation for the adverse impact of CAP
reforms on the ACP countries should also
be separated from the EPA negotiation
process.
4 Options for the ACP countries
Different negotiating options 
Generally speaking, and in terms of negoti-
ating strategies for the ACP countries as a
whole, it appears important, if the maxi-
mum concessions are to be obtained from
the EU, to play on the possibility of not sign-
ing an EPA in the negotiations. In other
words, signing an EPA could be made condi-
tional upon the satisfaction of a number of
requirements and alternatives to the EPA
could be explored in a more detailed way. As
many resources as possible should therefore
be channelled into analysing alternatives to
the EPA as into the potential impact of an
EPA.
These alternatives differ depending on
whether the ACP countries are LDCs or not:• for the LDCs, the alternative is the EBA ini-
tiative, but a number of factors such as
the rules of origin need to be reviewed so
that the initiative offers LDCs genuine
potential for European market access;• for the non-LDCs, the alternative is the
GSP or GSP+ for those complying with
governance and environmental respect
criteria. A form of GSP++ for the ACP
countries, offering more advantageous
conditions than the GSP+, could also be
proposed.21
The risks inherent in an EPA in comparison
with the alternatives available to the LDC
and non-LDC ACP countries are clearly evi-
dent and are connected with competition
from European imports in local, national
and regional production sectors. In these cir-
cumstances, the ACP countries should draw
inspiration from the EU’s strategy in the pre-
vious free trade agreements which it has
signed, and should negotiate the maximum
possible control of the liberalisation process.
Various flexibility measures will need to be
drawn up for this purpose:• exclusion of “sensitive” products for the
ACP countries, over relatively long periods
depending on the degree of sensitivity or
competitiveness of products; i.e. different
progressive liberalisation timetables for
different products;• a timetable revision clause if local prod-
ucts do not become competitive enough
and do not enable, as expected, fair com-
petition;• a flexibility clause to cover reforms of the
CAP which have potentially adverse con-
sequences for the ACP countries;• a special safeguard mechanism under
which it is possible to apply additional
duties or even quantitative restrictions on
European imports if there are massive
rises in import volumes or substantial
price drops.
Flexibility measures are likely to be particu-
larly important for the ACP countries whose
trade with the EU is substantial. This is true
overall of the African countries, but not of
the Caribbean and Pacific countries whose
main trading partners differ (United States
for the former and Australia and New
Zealand for the latter). In the case of ACP
countries which export a large proportion of
their products or of a specific product, CAP
reforms and therefore the flexibility clause
are particularly important.
In short …
An analysis of the previous free-trade
agreements (FTAs) concluded by the EU and
its partners shows that EU agricultural
product imports are far from being fully
liberalised.
In the case of products for which the EU
conducts an interventionist agricultural
policy, it is very reluctant to lower duties
which protect it from imports from third
countries.
Experience seems to show that, as regards
EPAs, a number of particularly sensitive
products are likely to be excluded from
liberalisation by the EU.The EU needs to
propose instruments through which it can
control the liberalisation process: different
liberalisation timetables for different
products, safeguard clauses, revision clauses,
and flexibility clauses in particular.
In short …
To obtain maximum concessions from the
EU, the ACP countries need to play on the
possibility of not signing an EPA in the
negotiations. It is also important to weigh
up the alternatives to the EPA and to
channel the necessary human and technical
resources into analysing these alternatives
and their advantages and drawbacks in
comparison with an EPA.
For the LDCs, the alternative is the EBA
initiative: if it is to provide genuine
opportunities for access to the EU market,
its rules of origin need to be reviewed. For
the non-LDCs, the alternative to the EPA has
to be more favourable than the current GSP
– as well as the GSP+ - if they are to retain
preferential access to the EU market. This
would involve a kind of GSP++ which needs
to be thought out. All the ACP countries,
whether LDCs or not, need to retain as much
control of the liberalisation process as
possible in order to mitigate the risks linked
to the introduction of reciprocity into the
EPAs. Ambitious flexibility measures
therefore need to be drawn up, such as:
• different liberalisation timetables,
which are as flexible as possible, for
different products,
• a revision clause to cover greater than
expected competition between local
output and imports from the EU,
• a flexibility clause under which
liberalisation conditions can be adjusted
if CAP reforms make this necessary,
• a special safeguard mechanism to cover
sudden changes in competition
conditions in the world market.
Those African countries which are not very
competitive will need very substantial
flexibility as regards the timetable and
degree of liberalisation. Lastly, the ACP
countries need to negotiate ambitious
measures so that they are able as far as
possible to eliminate the structural supply
constraints from which they suffer.
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Towards a development package 
The accompanying measures making up the
development strand of an EPA should be
geared towards two objectives: making local
sectors more competitive and developing
regional trade. More competitive local ACP
sectors are a must if genuine benefits are to
be gained from the European market access
opportunities offered by an EPA and if com-
petition from European imports is to be
withstood. Structural supply constraints
need to be eliminated if competitiveness is
to be improved. For some products and in
some ACP regions, there is, moreover, a real
regional trade dynamic which needs to be
preserved and enhanced. An EPA could be
signed only if its development strand
includes sufficient guarantees of actual
implementation of a package of accompa-
nying measures geared towards these two
complementary objectives.
Accompanying measures could be of various
types:• measures helping to make local products
more competitive in terms of price and
quality: enhancing local products, respect
of contractual deadlines, regular supplies,
etc. ;• measures covering the key aspects of SPS
standards and compliance with European
regulations;• links with the Action Plan for agricultural
commodities proposed by the EU in 2004
and adopted by the European
Development Fund (EDF) Committee in
2006;• measures fostering trade at regional level:
assistance with computerisation of cus-
toms systems, simplification of adminis-
trative procedures, and infrastructure.
5 Towards an EPA fostering ACP
agriculture 
An “ideal” agreement on agriculture in the
EPAs would obviously be an agreement con-
taining more gains than risks: in other
words an agreement which would maximise
European market access opportunities and
make it possible not just to mitigate the
risks of competition in local and regional
markets but rather to strengthen these
markets in a way which is consistent with
the objectives of regional agricultural poli-
cies. This means:• Negotiating the complete opening-up of
European markets, without quotas or
duties; this would involve extending the
EBA scheme to the non-LDC ACP coun-
tries.• Excluding all products deemed to be sen-
sitive, and not just within the 20% limit
connected with the EU’s interpretation of
Article XXIV of the GATT. It would be
advantageous in particular:- to exclude immediately all the tariff
lines for which there are not at present
imports from the EU to the ACP coun-
tries. As import volumes are zero, a
strategy of this kind may appear neu-
tral but nevertheless makes it possible
to ensure margins of manoeuvre in the
medium to long term if the ACP coun-
tries want to develop the sectors cov-
ered by these tariff lines in the future;- to be able to raise the levels of duty on
products excluded from the EPA. This
may involve amending the structure of
the Common External Tariff (CET)
decided by the ACP regions if the maxi-
mum levels do not in future provide
adequate protection against competi-
tion from European imports.• Ensuring that European export aids are
effectively abolished as soon as tariffs on
European imports are abolished. In prac-
tice, export subsidies make European
imports particularly competitive on local
and regional markets. Abolishing tariffs
on these products would undoubtedly
exacerbate unfair competition.• Drawing on the negotiating strategy
which the EU used when signing FTAs
with various trading partners. This strat-
egy helped the EU to make concessions
while preserving its interests. The strategy
consists in negotiating an implementa-
tion of the agreement which is as gradual
and flexible as possible and allows the
widest possible margins of manoeuvre in
both the short and the long term. The
ACP countries could therefore:- strengthen the rules of origin on prod-
ucts imported from the EU;- as regards the timetable:- progress step by step towards reci-
procity, for each sector, depending on
progress towards greater competitive-
ness. The timetable should make pro-
vision for the abolition of customs
duties only if there are sufficient guar-
antees of a sector’s competitiveness;
otherwise, abolition should be post-
poned to a later date (this would
introduce a kind of conditional liberal-
isation);- negotiate an extension of the imple-
mentation period beyond 12 years;- graduate tariff reductions over the
implementation period (no sudden
abolition of tariffs);- as regards flexibility measures, negoti-
ate:- safeguard measures (temporary
import ban, for instance) if European
imports of liberalised products
increase too quickly;- a revision clause: products “included”
in liberalisation could be excluded at
any time if there is a change in
European policy which makes EU
imports more competitive than
expected at the time of the decision
to include them;- a development clause: this would
make it possible at any time to
exclude a sector which a country
wanted to develop, especially in con-
nection with regional integration
issues such as food security, and
which was competing with European
imports. This clause would be based
on the principle that the long-term
development strategies of countries
should be taken into account. While
there may be advantages in the short
term in obtaining less expensive
industrial machinery from the EU
under an EPA, the “inclusion” of this
machinery in the EPA should not
undermine any opportunity for its
local production.
Lastly, with a view to an “ideal” EPA on agri-
culture, all the alternatives to an EPA should
be examined when negotiating an agree-
ment, whether the EBA initiative, the GSP or
even the possibility of obtaining a third
WTO derogation in respect of the Cotonou
regime.
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Box 1. WTO Agreement on Agriculture and developments at Hong Kong 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which is part of the Marrakech Agreement signed in 1994 is intended to regulate trade in agricultural products and
support policies. It covers three kinds of agricultural policy instrument: 1) border protection instruments (“market access” pillar); 2) export aids (“export
competition” pillar) and 3) production aids (“domestic support” pillar). Other WTO agreements cover some aspects which may concern the agricultural
sector directly, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)21 and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).
Pillars AoA Developments at Hong Kong 
Market access Negotiations on market access covered tariffication, i.e. the
conversion of non-tariff measures into tariffs, tariff reductions
and bound tariffs. The tariff reductions imposed on the devel-
oped countries are stricter (36% over six years in comparison
with 24% over ten years for the developing countries, with no
reduction commitment on the part of the LDCs). The
Agreement also provides for the use of tariff quotas (TQs) at
reduced rates of duty to ensure a minimum import threshold. It
also contains a special safeguard clause allowing countries to
manage, under certain circumstances, sudden increases in
imports.
At Hong Kong, the members made provision for four reduction
bands, but did not reach agreement on the threshold levels for
the developed and developing countries. The final declaration
introduces some flexibility into this pillar: sensitive products,
special products (SP) and the special safeguard mechanism
(SSM). Even though this flexibility needs to be laid down in more
detail, some progress has been made from the July 2004 frame-
work.
As regards special products, the Hong Kong Declaration takes up
the G33 proposal in which the LDCs have “the flexibility to self-
designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as Special
Products guided by indicators based on the criteria of food secu-
rity, livelihood security and rural development”. Moreover, they
“will also have the right to have recourse to a Special Safeguard
Mechanism based on import quantity and price triggers”,
although the precise arrangements have yet to be defined in
detail.
As regards the issue of preference erosion, along the lines of the
framework agreement of July 2004, the Hong Kong Declaration
recalls its importance, but gives no information on the way in
which it should be treated.
Lastly, in Hong Kong, the members accepted the opening up of
the market of the developed and advanced developing countries
to exports from the LDCs (not simply agricultural products) for
97% of all tariff lines.
Export
competition 
Export subsidy commitments are intended to regulate export
aid via a notification and reduction system accepted by com-
mon agreement (36% reduction over six years from 1996 for
the developed countries and 24% over ten years for the devel-
oping countries in comparison with the base period 1986-1990).
The subsidised export volume is also reduced by 21% over six
years for the developed countries and 14% over 10 years for the
developing countries (the LDCs benefiting from an exemption).
Lastly, during the six-month implementation period, the devel-
oping countries are allowed to use subsidies under certain con-
ditions in order to reduce the cost of marketing and transport
of exports.
Under this pillar, the main result since July 2004 has undoubt-
edly been the undertaking by the members at Hong Kong to
“ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies
and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect” …
by the end of 2013 … “in a progressive and parallel manner … so
that a substantial part is realized by the end of the first half of
the implementation period”.
Domestic 
support
Domestic support measures are classified by “box” (amber, blue
and green), the trade-distorting effect decreasing from the
“amber box” to the “green box”. Support entailing the most dis-
tortion (or support coming within the “amber box”) is calcu-
lated by means of the Total Aggregate Measurement of
Support (Total AMS) for the base period 1986-1988 and is to be
reduced by 20% over six years starting in 1995 for the devel-
oped countries and 13% over ten years for the developing coun-
tries (the LDCs being exempted). The AoA makes no provision
for commitments to reduce domestic support measures in the
“green box” (as support is not linked to production volumes or
prices, or decoupled support) and the “blue box” (support
granted under programmes limiting production, or partially
decoupled support). Similarly, minimum support (”de minimis”
support) is allowed (5% of agricultural production for the devel-
oped countries and 10% for the developing countries).
The members agreed at Hong Kong to adopt three bands for the
reduction of domestic support without, however, specifying the
extent of the reductions to be made. They also undertook to
carry out overall reductions of trade-distorting domestic sup-
port, reductions which should be at least equal to the total
reductions of the “orange box”, the “blue box” and de minimis
support. According to a further provision, moreover, “developing
country Members with no AMS commitments will be exempt
from reductions in de minimis and the overall cut in trade-dis-
torting domestic support”.
While the text makes provision for real reductions in the levels
of support granted by the developed countries (without limiting
this to the band between the bound rate levels and those
applied) and makes provision for flexibility enabling the devel-
oping countries to grant domestic support, it does not contain
any rule on “blue box” support. The declaration makes little
progress as regards criteria for the “green box”.
Source Box 1: adapted from V. Fautrel, C.B. Greenidge, ACP states on the approach to Hong Kong – an analysis of some key agricultural issues in the light of
the 31st July WTO package, CTA, discussion document for Agritrade, January 2005, http://agritrade.cta.int/en/content/view/full/1793
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Box 2. Choice of negotiations between the WTO and the EPA
Negotiating forum
1. Reduction or
elimination of
residual tariff
barriers
2. Tariff 
escalation
3. Maintaining
preferences
4. Rules of origin
5. SPS standards
and TBT
6. Improving com-
petitiveness
(removing sup-
ply constraints)
7. The integration
of S&DT in tariff
reductions
8. Products to be
protected (sen-
sitive products,
special products
to be excluded
from an EPA)
9. Safeguard
measures
11. Redefinition of
Article XXIV
12. Domestic sup-
ports of devel-
oped countries
13. Export sup-
ports of devel-
oped countries
First choice
EPA
-The EU is the main export market for the ACP countries, in particu-
lar the African countries
-The EU reduction commitments can be more ambitious and include
sensitive products in the framework of the CAP.
EPA
-The EU is the main trading partner of the African countries
(Caribbean and Pacific countries have closer relations with North
America, and Australia and New Zealand, respectively).
-The EPA must reduce EU tariffs on all products, including sensitive
products and agricultural products containing sensitive products.
WTO
The issue for the ACP countries is to specify the products for which
their trade preferences are strong, so that the generalised reduction
of tariffs is either lower or slower in respect of those products. That
must be linked with the negotiations on sensitive and special prod-
ucts. Thus, the ACP proposal on long-term preferences is that the
products benefiting from these preferences should be declared sen-
sitive products by the countries which grant the said preferences (in
this case the EU for the preferences granted to the ACP countries).
EPA
The rules of origin must be made more flexible in the framework of
the GSP, including for the EBA initiative, so as to enable LDCs truly to
benefit from them.
EPA
-It is difficult to make the standards more flexible, unlike the rules
of origin.
-The development strand of the EPA could nevertheless provide the
ACP countries with opportunities if they can obtain firm commit-
ments from the EU in terms of technical assistance.
EPA
The negotiations on the development strand of the EPAs, which have
not really started, could help to achieve this objective.
WTO
The tariff reduction formula for developing countries cannot be the
same as that used for developed countries (ACP and G33 proposal).
WTO
-The multilateral negotiations are particularly advanced on the
question of special products (G33 proposal).
-The designation of special products must however be linked with
the list of sensitive products that can be excluded from an EPA and
are to be defined at regional level.
WTO
-The multilateral negotiations are very advanced also on this point
(G33 proposal).
EPA
-It is important to reach an agreement first of all between the ACP
countries and the EU to clarify certain terms (how far to go on asym-
metry and the length of the implementation period), in order to be
able to table a sufficiently technical and detailed proposal at the WTO.
WTO
The WTO is the appropriate forum to deal with the question of the
unfair competition of imports. Of note is the G33 proposal on special
products stating that all products benefiting from amber and blue
box export supports should be considered as special products.
WTO
Same.
Second choice
WTO
Any generalised reduction of tariffs at the WTO leads to
an additional erosion of the long-standing trade prefer-
ences of the ACP countries with the EU in comparison
with non-ACP countries.
WTO
-The elimination of the escalation of tariffs applied by
trading partners other than the EU to ACP products must
be accomplished in the framework of S&DT and enable a
revision of the GSPs.
-Little progress has been made on producing a formula
which takes account of this question.
EPA
-The elimination of tariffs on the EU’s sensitive products
exported by non-LDC ACP countries, accentuates their
preferences in relation to non-ACP countries.
-It nevertheless leads to an erosion of those of the LDC
ACP countries which already benefit from zero rate tariffs
(EBA initiative) in relation to non-LDC ACP countries.
-The consequences in terms of erosion of preferences for
the ACP countries in relation to non-ACP countries of the
CAP reform (Product protocols in the framework of the
sugar and bananas CMOs) must be taken into account in
a compensation mechanism.
WTO
The EPA negotiations can facilitate progress in the negoti-
ations on the agreement on the rules of origin.
WTO
Better participation of the ACP countries in the interna-
tional bodies that draw up the standards.
WTO
-The issues of development and technical assistance are
part of the negotiations in several ways: the current
round of negotiations has been described as a develop-
ment round; technical assistance is provided for in the
framework of S&DT, in particular to help LDCs to be in a
position to comply with the new SPS standards.
-However, in practice these provisions are still very weak.
EPA
The tariff reduction formula must be defined in a way that
is consistent with the designation of the products to be
protected (sensitive and special products to be excluded
from an EPA).
EPA
-The definition of a mechanism specific to EU imports can
be based on that drawn up at multilateral level.
WTO
-Support a proposal to modify Article XXIV in agreement
with the compromise found in the EPA negotiations, in
order to ensure the stability of the compromise.
Access to the markets of developed countries (including the EU)
Competition on ACP markets
Source Box 2: Table 8 in Alpha, A., B. Faucheux, B. Hermelin and V. Fautrel, WTO and EPA Negotiations: For an Enhanced Coordination of ACP Positions on
Agriculture, ECDPM Discussion Paper 70 with CTA, December 2005, www.ecdpm.org/dp70
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